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This article explores the relationship between existentialism and the horror genre. 
Noël Carroll and others have proposed that horror monsters defy established 
categories. Carroll also argues that the emotion they provoke - ‘art-horror’ – is a 
‘composite’ of fear and disgust. I argue that the sometimes horrifying images and 
metaphors of Sartre’s early philosophy, which correlate with nausea and anxiety, is a 
non-coincidental commonality with art-horror explained by existentialism’s 
preoccupation with the interstitial nature of the self. Further, it is argued that, as is 
the case with some of the more sophisticated examples of the horror genre, the way 
for existential protagonists like Roquentin and Gregor Samsa to meet the challenge of 
the horrifying involves an accommodation of these features of the existential 
condition within their developing identity, and in so doing appear monstrous to 
others. Lastly, it is claimed that the association between existentialism and art-horror 
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Existentialism and Art-Horror 
 
 
‘It doesn’t take much for the world to fall apart does it?’ (Ben in Night of the Living 
Dead) 
 
‘I am no one’ (Regan MacNeil’s possessing demon in The Exorcist) 
 





    In their bid to disrupt everyday assumptions, writings classed as ‘existential’ tend 
to trade in the unusual and the unexpected. Most of the fictional works (and 
sometimes the non-fiction as well) evoke an uncanny atmosphere; many portray 
extreme situations (Fear and Trembling, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Crime and 
Punishment, Heart of Darkness, Sisyphus, The Plague, The Flies, The Reprieve, Dirty 
Hands), and some include elements of surrealism (Metamorphosis, The Trial, Nausea, 
No Exit). This oddness has generated comparisons with subversive, extreme and 
nihilistic art forms such as absurdist theatre,1 film noir,2 and beatnik literature,3 but so 
far very little has been written on its relationship with the horror genre.4
    My aim here is to show that existentialism and horror share some important 
features, and that an investigation of this connection can enrich our understanding of 
both. More precisely, in the first instance I want to highlight the close association 
between some concepts and imagery of the early Sartre and the horror genre. Then I 
want to argue that this association is understandable if we realise that the notion of the 
interstitial – that which falls between established categories – is a central concern in 
both cases. A development of this point identifies what might be called a ‘narrative of 
awakening’ in existentialism that is mirrored in horror fictions. This sees protagonists 
overcoming their initial rejection of threatening and repelling circumstances and 
replacing them with a form of acceptance that, crucially, requires a shift in their sense 
of identity in the direction of the monstrous. Finally, I want to claim that this shared 
concern helps explain the appeal of horror, and in so doing contributes a solution to 
the ‘paradox of horror’ – the question of why we are drawn to films, stories and 
images designed to provoke emotions we would normally seek to avoid.  
 
 
II: The nature and paradox of art-horror 
    I take my lead on the nature of the horror genre from Noël Carroll’s seminal work 
The Philosophy of Horror.5 In this he argues for a particular definition of horror and 
then goes on to address some riddles of aesthetic emotions, including the paradox of 
horror. There are three aspects of his theory that are of particular relevance to my 
aims here. The first is his analysis of what quality or qualities horror monsters will 
typically possess in order to affect the audience in the appropriate ways. The second is 
the matter of identifying the particular emotions that are provoked by these monsters 
and by the narratives in which they are situated. Since the elicitation of strong 
emotions in its audience is a defining feature of horror, an understanding of what 
precisely these responses are and what they mean should expedite a deeper 
understanding of the genre. Third is Carroll’s discussion of the ‘paradox of horror’; 
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the problem of why we seek out stories and images that provoke these negative 
feelings. This last aspect will be the focus of the final section of this article 
(‘Explaining Horror’s Appeal’), and in what follows the first two aspects will be 
explored. 
    On the question of what makes a monster horrifying, Carroll’s view is that they are 
‘interstitial’ or ‘impure’. They are not entirely alien to us, but rather fall between 
familiar categories: for example, living and dead (vampires, zombies, Frankenstein’s 
monster), human and beast (werewolves, Kurt Neumann’s / David Cronenberg’s The 
Fly), human and supernatural entity (William Peter Blatty’s / William Friedkin’s The 
Exorcist, Richard Donner’s The Omen, Alan Parker’s Angel Heart), the intelligent and 
the inert (Stephen King’s Christine, James Herbert’s The Fog), the intelligent and the 
unintelligent organic (golems, Hitchcock’s birds, Wyndham’s triffids, killer tomatoes, 
blobs), innocence and corruption/insanity (King’s Misery and The Shining, child 
possessions and poltergeists), the young and the old (the ‘child’ vampire in Tomas 
Alfredson’s  recent Swedish art-house horror Let the Right One In).6  
    It is not hard to find broad support for this kind of position. Timothy Beal has 
theorized around a similar ‘betwixt and between’ account of the nature of horror 
monsters and their origins in Judeo-Christian religion, 7 and citing among others 
Nietzsche and Foucault, Richard Kearney explains how 
 
[c]reatures which hang around borders, and disrespect their integrity are 
traditionally described as monsters. They comprise a species of sinister 
miscreants exiled from the normative categories of the established system. A 
species of non-species, as it were. Alien monsters represent the ‘unthought’ of 
any given point of knowledge and representation, the unfamiliar spectre which 
returns to haunt the secure citadel of consciousness.8  
 
    However, since fairytales and science fiction also commonly involve interstitial 
entities (dwarves, elves, androids, alien species etc.) this element becomes a necessary 
but not sufficient condition. To complete the definition Carroll claims that a film or 
book’s membership of the horror genre is also determined by the emotions it 
engenders in its audience. They must of course frighten us, but there is also the  
 
tendency in horror novels and stories to describe monsters in terms of and to 
associate them with filth, decay, deterioration, slime and so on. This monster in 
horror fiction … is not only lethal but … also disgusting.9  
 
    ‘Art-horror’ is the name Carroll gives to this ‘compound’ emotion.10 Highlighting 
fear is uncontroversial, but making disgust so central to the emotionality associated 
with this art form requires some justification.  
    Carroll cites two main sources of evidence for this claim. The first is simply the 
appearance and behaviour of the monsters. A quick survey yields multiple examples 
of creatures that contain, say, the corpse-like and insect-like aspects of everyday life 
that typically disgust us. Monsters must of course have the power to threaten – to be 
strong, violent, deadly, aggressive, malicious, and so on - but also they are outwardly 
vile and grotesque. Take, for example, the rotting bodies of zombies and the decaying 
visage of Freddy Kruger; the saliva and slime-smeared eggs of the Alien; the green 
vomit in The Exorcist; Cronenberg’s hairy vomiting Fly, his slug-like blob in Shivers 
and exploding heads in Scanners. Then there is the blood-injection-injury phobia 
inducing sight of Clive Barker’s Pinhead (in Hellraiser); the multiple blood-baths and 
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gore-fests of the splatter sub-genre; the common use of worms, maggots, slugs, 
spiders, snakes and slime in gentler teenage series and films like the BBC’s Dr Who, 
Tim Burton’s The Nightmare before Christmas, Joss Whedon’s Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer and Ivan Reitman’s Ghost Busters through to more adult features like Ron 
Underwood’s Tremors,  Stephen King’s The Mist, Sam Raimi’s recent Drag Me to 
Hell and Umberto Lenzi’s horror exploitation film Cannibal Ferox. 
     Horror monsters, it seems, are disgusting on two counts. On the one hand they are 
interstitial, and whether in stories or in real life that which we find disgusting is 
typically something that cannot be located within stable, familiar classifications. 
Carroll cites a number of everyday life examples, including certain cultures’ 
avoidance of ‘ambiguous’ animals like flying squirrels and lobsters, and our dislike of 
things like false teeth, spittle, blood, sweat, nail and hair clippings, that transgress the 
categories of ‘me/not me, inside/outside, and living/dead’.11 In this respect a threat 
need only be chimerical to be potentially monstrous, but it is also the case that 
animals (and other, usually organic, objects) we typically find threatening and 
disgusting (such as spiders, insects and snakes), but which are not themselves - or at 
least not in any obvious sense - category-defying, can enhance the monstrousness of 
the fictional entity (hence a giant intelligently predatory spider is more effective than 
a giant intelligently predatory sheep12). 
    The second piece of evidence is grounded in the observation that the expressions 
and feelings of the audience of art-horror tend to ‘parallel’ those of its characters. This 
is an unusual feature of the genre. As Carroll points out, we do not feel jealous when 
Othello does, and ‘when a comic character takes a pratfall, he hardly feels joyous’,13 
but he claims that the aim is for horror audiences to feel a version of what the victims 
and witnesses of horror monsters feel. This presents a ‘methodological advantage’ in 
that in order to identify the responses of the audience it is possible to step beyond 
introspection and seek to identify the responses of the characters. And through 
analysing ‘expressions and gestures’ the emotion Carroll finds ‘regularly recurring’ 
alongside fear is disgust.14
     In the novel Dracula, for instance, Bram Stoker writes, 
 
As the count leaned over me and his hand touched me, I could not repress a 
shudder. It may have been that his breath was rank, but a horrible feeling of 
nausea came over me, which do what I would, I could not conceal.15  
 
    Disgust has been categorized as a universal emotion by virtue of a methodology of 
cross-culturally recognizable facial expressions.16 Like fear therefore, it ought to be 
easy to identify on the faces of characters in films. In The Exorcist, for example, the 
mother of the possessed girl Regan puts her hand to her mouth and looks sick on 
several occasions, perhaps most obviously when, with Regan under hypnosis, the 
possessing demon makes its first unambiguous appearance. Here she backs off, 
staggering, her hand fixed over her mouth with a stare of intense fear. But instead of 
the rounded sockets of alarm her eyes are framed by eyebrows that tilt slightly 
upwards, indicating distress, curiosity, and essentially disgust. 
   A further argument (not Carroll’s) supporting the view that disgust is a defining 
component of art-horror concerns the future-oriented nature of fear. Horror (in its 
narrative form) is about build-up and suspense, the fearful anticipation of what is to 
come. But what about when it does come? What about when the victims are 
confronted by the creature in all its horrific reality? Usually of course fear remains – 
much of the time when the victim is alive there are worse things that can happen 
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(though this is not true of, for instance, the cocooned people in the Alien’s human 
larder), but there is also something that is happening. One response can be anger, 
others can be despair, pain and loss, but one we do indeed typically see – and indeed 
one that is fairly specific to the horror genre – is disgust. In short, fear and (some 
forms of) anxiety correspond to what is to come, disgust corresponds to what is in the 
present. 
    Before turning to an examination of horror imagery and themes in Sartre’s 
existentialism I want to briefly mention another angle on art-horror that is given less 
space by Carroll – the unknown. ‘To make any thing very terrible,’ says Edmund 
Burke in his Enquiry, 
 
obscurity seems in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any 
danger … a great deal of the apprehension vanishes. Every one will be sensible 
of this, who considers how greatly night adds to our dread, in all cases of 
danger, and how much the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which none can 
have clear ideas, affect minds, which give credit to the popular tales concerning 
such sorts of beings.17
 
In a sense the unknown can be understood as another term for the interstitial; an entity 
is unknown (as in not understood and perhaps not previously encountered) by virtue 
of not adhering to familiar categories. As Carroll discusses at length, as far as 
narrative construction goes the mystery surrounding a monster prior to its full 
exposure is a key ingredient of horror plots, but it is also the case that some horror 
texts – albeit possibly fringe members of the genre - play on adversaries that are so 
distant and mysterious that they are unable to disgust us .18 Fear and anxiety are 
instead predominant, as are feelings of awe that tie art-horror to religious experience 
(and indeed the sublime). Carroll discusses H. P. Lovecraft’s ideas on our fearful yet 
‘awed listening’ to what lies beyond ‘the known universe’s utmost rim’,19 but most 
monsters do not invoke such feelings, and at best he sees this as typifying only a sub-
category of the genre. 
    In this article I am primarily limiting myself to the existentialism-horror themes 
apparent in Sartre’s work, and the mystery and otherness of ‘Being’ is not one of 
them. However, in the work of other existentialists – particularly of course the Judeo-
Christian variety, but also Heidegger – mysticism does have a place, and thus 
affective responses to what is radically other could present another possibility for an 
investigation of this type.  
 
 
III: Sartre and art-horror 
    I want to argue that at the heart of the connection between existentialism and horror 
is the deeply interstitial nature of human existence. Horror ideas and imagery occur in 
existentialist writings – particularly those of Sartre – because both genres deal with 
life forms that disturb us by defying familiar categories. If Carroll is right and the 
defining emotions of art-horror are disgust and fear, then the role of anxiety and 
nausea as two central concepts revealing the self’s relationship to itself and the world 
in Sartre’s early philosophy is significant.20 It is under these two headings that I will 
investigate Sartre and existentialism’s connection with horror before, in the last two 
sections of this article, discussing, firstly, how this relationship throws light on the 







    Carroll discusses how ‘objects can raise categorical misgivings by virtue of being 
incomplete representatives of their class, such as rotting and disintegrating things, as 
well as by virtue of being formless, for example, dirt’.21 Formless monsters (or 
monsters that dwell in or emerge from formless habitats) are surprisingly common: 
think of Irwin Yeaworth’s The Blob, and the palpably threatening quality of darkness, 
fog, and murky water. In frequent association we find spit, saliva, slime, vomit, 
wetness and, of course, blood (e.g. Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining, Stuart Rosenberg’s 
Amityville Horror, Brian De Palma’s Carrie), 22 and the oozing quality engendered by 
swarms of insects or a mass of worms or maggots is effective partly because it creates 
the impression of formlessness. 
    By this measure Roquentin’s existential crisis in Sartre’s Nausea resembles a 
horror story.23 He experiences episodes in which the material world threatens to 
invade and engulf him. Things become monstrous - rather than merely, say, hazardous 
or dangerous in the everyday sense - because they reach beyond the routine and 
functional boundaries of everydayness. They are seen in an ‘other-worldly’ way. 
Objects ‘stir to a new and ghastly life of mindless, boundless abundance, shaking off 
their previous availability’.24 Crawling beneath its ‘thin green film’ the ‘real sea is 
cold and black, full of animals’.25 Lurking at the fringes of the town is vegetation that 
has crept towards it ‘for mile after mile’, waiting for its chance to ‘grip’ the paving 
stones and ‘burst them open with its long black pincers … and hang its green paws 
everywhere’.26 The object Roquentin is sitting on metamorphoses into a kind of dead 
animal, refusing to be normalised by its name – ‘seat’ – which Roquentin incants in a 
vain attempt at an ‘exorcism’ of its raw existence.27 The individuality of things melts 
away ‘leaving soft, monstrous masses …with a frightening, obscene nakedness’.28   
 
Things have broken free from their names. They are there, grotesque, stubborn, 
gigantic, and it seems ridiculous to call them seats or say anything at all about 
them: I am in the midst of the Things, which cannot be given names. Alone, 
wordless, defenceless, they surround me, under me, behind me, above me. They 
demand nothing, they don’t impose themselves, they are there.29
 
    This transformation applies to our bodies as well. Roquentin finds his hand is 
‘alive’ (a scene that, importantly for my thesis, also incorporates blood, sweat and 
finger nails); looking like ‘an animal upside down’ - a ‘crab’ or a ‘fish’. ‘The fingers 
are the paws’ and he amuses himself ‘by making them move about very quickly’.30 
Such surrealism illuminates the ontological status of the material world, and in so-
doing illuminates the ontological status of consciousness. Thus viewed, the for-itself 
is exposed as insubstantial, ungraspable and fragile, vulnerable all the time it is not 
creatively engaged with the world.  
    Roquentin insists that, 
 
Objects ought not to touch, since they are not alive. You use them, you put them 
back in place, you live among them: they are useful, nothing more. But they 
touch me, it's unbearable. I am afraid of entering in contact with them.31  
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    In Nausea this sinister absurdity is vividly signified by viscous, sticky, sugary 
substances; substances that are neither liquid nor solid, that are overflowing, unruly 
and clingy; existence is ‘that huge presence … gumming everything up, all thick, a 
jelly’.32 Things that ‘threaten to grow, to spread, to swarm over us’, that ‘ooze’ and 
are ‘like paste’,33 are for Sartre the most potent symbol of a trespassing over the 
boundary of the for-itself and the in-itself, and it is art-horror’s affinity with what 
oozes that presents one of the strongest connections with Sartre’s existentialism. 
    The underlying cause of Roquentin’s nausea, as he discovers towards the end of the 
novel, is the ‘superfluity’ of objects. They are ultimately unexplainable; they 
‘overflow’ the categories we must inevitably impose on them. They are without final 
purpose, and it would ultimately make no difference if they did not exist. But exist 
they do, unavoidably. The absurdity or senselessness of the material world is 
transformed into a kind of horror. We are creatures that desire sense, and yet this most 
permanent and nonnegotiable aspect of the world, when abstracted from everyday 
functionality, has none. At bottom existence is unquestionably there, in many ways so 
familiar, and yet at the same time unknowable. Things are ‘thoughts which stopped 
half way’.34  
   Even more revealing of this aspect of Sartre’s philosophy is his ‘psychoanalysis of 
things’ in Part Four of Being and Nothingness.35 His main interest is in the symbolic 
meaning of ‘slime’ or ‘sliminess’; something he takes seriously enough to describe it 
as ‘a great ontological region’.36 The reason for its importance is its ‘ambiguous’, 
‘metamorphic’ nature. 
     Sartre’s phenomenological ontology allows for the ‘moral’ qualities of substances 
to be as primary as their physical ones,37 and the immediate response ‘inspired’ by 
sliminess is one of fear and disgust.38 This immediate, emotional response we can 
trace to a form of ambiguity possessed by slime that is powerfully symbolic of the 
for-itself’s peculiar relationship with the in-itself. Firstly it is an ‘imitation of 
liquidity’, an ‘aberrant fluid’. Liquid for Sartre is symbolic of the for-itself (clear, 
formless etc.), but slime is a ‘triumph of the solid over the liquid’; 39 in other words of 
the ‘indifferent’ in-itself over the for-itself. In contrast with water, ‘[n]othing testifies 
more clearly to its ambiguous character as a “substance in between two states” than 
the slowness with which the slimy melts into itself.’40 Essential to the disgust evoked 
by slime is its ‘softness’ which is 
 
leech like. If an object which I hold in my hand is solid, I can let go when I 
please; its inertia symbolizes for me my total power; I give it its foundation, but 
it does not furnish any foundation for me. … Yet here is the slimy reversing the 
terms; the for-itself is suddenly compromised. I open my hand, I want to let go 
of the slimy and it sticks to me … sucks at me.41  
 
It is also seductive, it holds our attention,42 a ‘poisonous possession’ that threatens to 
control or ‘compromise’ us. At this point Sartre’s description has a particularly strong 
kinship with a horror narrative: 
 
The slime is a liquid seen in a nightmare, where all its properties are animated 
by a sort of life and turn back against me. Slime is the revenge of the in-itself. A 
sickly-sweet, feminine revenge which will be symbolized on another level by 
quality of “sugary” … A sugary sliminess is the ideal of the slimy; it symbolizes 
the sugary death of the for-itself (like that of the wasp which sinks into the jam 
and drowns in it.)43  
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Basic to our feelings about the slimy is its lack of stability. With little encouragement 
it is on the move, like quicksand. Quicksand (though not an example that Sartre 
himself uses) is indeed insidious. It is only muddy sand, but it is deceptive; it is deep 
and shifting, and it sucks. It is animated in a sense that allows it to easily become a 
monster in the imagination. Sartre says, 
 
If I sink in the slimy I feel that I am going to be lost in it; that is, that I may 
dissolve in the slime precisely because the slimy is in the process of 
solidification. … In the very apprehension of the slimy there is a gluey 
substance, compromising and without equilibrium, like the haunting memory of 
a metamorphosis.44  
 
At its heart what it symbolizes for Sartre is ‘an ideal being in which the 
foundationless in-itself has priority over the for-itself’.45 If meaning inheres in all 
intentional objects, this truth must also have a meaning, and here lies the roots of our 
nausea. The meaning of a necessarily meaning-filled world is, firstly, that there is an 
external world that exists independently of intentionality, and secondly that the 
humanly dependent phenomenological world is subject to radical alternation. The 
result is the antithesis of that other ideal being – the in-itself-for-itself – an antithesis 
that Sartre calls an ‘antivalue’. 
    Just as the for-itself pursues the in-itself-for-itself, so it ‘flees’ the possibility of 
antivalue. We are afraid of and repulsed by slime because it symbolizes a disturbing 
ontological polarity. It incorporates the tension between freedom and facticity; a 
tension that cannot be overcome or undone, but which nevertheless ‘haunts’ 
consciousness. And thus, for example, ‘the horror of the slimy is … that facticity 
might progress continually and insensibly and absorb the for-itself’.46 For Roquentin 
an inversion occurs: ‘I am the thing. Existence, liberated’ (now a ‘nothing’) ‘surges 
over me’.47  
    Such absorption is a fiction – it is as impossible as the realization of the in-itself-
for-itself – and yet it is meaningful. An overwhelming nausea might be transitional as 
an authentic response to the in-itself, but it is not merely irrational. It signifies a host 
of ontological truths, one of which – one that is at the heart of Sartre’s ontology of the 
for-itself - is the notion of movement, or instability. Sartre, says Bernd Jager,  
 
seeks to empty consciousness of all weight, all opacity, all self-sufficiency, to 
take from it all possibility of absolute rest, to make it movement through and 
through.48  
 
And this is what the slimy gives us; it is ‘ambiguous’, shifty, ‘without equilibrium’.49 
In terms of its materiality it is neither one thing nor another, and this symbolizes 
something categorically fishy. Only the for-itself should have this fluid quality, and to 
find it in the in-itself is threatening and disgusting. In the next section I further discuss 
why the for-itself should feel threatened, but here it is enough to identify this link in 






    Most who write on the subject agree that, in contrast with fear, we experience 
anxiety in the face of something ‘indefinite’, ‘diffuse’ or ‘uncertain’.50 Its source 
might be felt or intuited rather than perceived or understood, or it might be 
ambiguous. In traditional psychoanalysis the aim is to discover what eludes us in the 
form of repressed memories, and though there is a partial analogue to this structure in 
existential philosophy and psychology – anxiety is in part caused by our avoidance of 
our condition – the origin of anxiety must in some sense always remain slippery. 
There are several reasons why this is the case, some of which were explored in the 
previous section, but perhaps most fundamental is the insubstantial, free and 
changeable nature of the self. If in nausea the in-itself reveals by way of contrast the 
fragility of the for-itself (unstable, impermanent, intentional), then in anxiety the for-
itself is confronted more directly.  
    Boundaries between one ontological category and another are fundamental to 
existentialism as a whole. It might be facticity and freedom; being and non-being; 
past, present and future; or, in its religious forms, the finite and the infinite.51 Broadly 
understood, we might say ‘we both belong and do not belong in the world’.52 
Sometimes dualisms are ‘dissolved’;53 sometimes we are haunted (and sometimes 
tempted) by the ideal of such dissolution; sometimes (such as in bad faith) we artfully 
conflate categories; sometimes we ‘dangle’ between commitments;54 sometimes we 
peer over the edge, balanced on a ‘dizzying crest’;55 most commonly we deliberately 
choose not to until, thinking we are ‘safe on the ground’, anxiety catches up and we 
‘suddenly … look down and notice that we are ‘standing on a narrow girder a 
thousand feet above the pavement.’56 Critically though, these boundaries imply 
fluidity. Being-for-itself is profoundly interstitial; it is the space, the nothingness, 
between other modes of being which it temporarily ‘haunts’ as they become subject to 
its freely chosen intentional gaze.  
     The result is that we are ‘threatened’ by our past and its implications; ‘disturbed’ 
by our insubstantial self. 57  We look for ‘reassuring myths’.58 We are a ghostly 
freedom – essentially homeless but always requiring a base from which to act in the 
world. 
    As a being which is ‘what it is not, and which is not what it is’,59 the for-itself must 
avoid two kinds of trap. One is illustrated by Roquentin’s remarks on the people in the 
café who each have ‘his little personal obstinacy which prevents him from noticing 
that he exists; there isn’t one of them who doesn’t think he is indispensable to 
somebody or something’.60 We seek refuge in a fictional self (a ‘little god’61); in 
socially prescribed roles – treat ourselves as if we were some ‘other’ or some ‘thing’.  
    The other trap is illustrated when in The Age of Reason Marcelle says of Mathieu,  
 
You’re so absurdly scared of being your own dupe ... that you would back out of 
the finest adventure in the world rather than risk telling yourself a lie.’ ... you are 
beginning to sterilize yourself a little ... you want to be nothing.62  
 
    The uncontainable quality of the for-itself is its anxiety. It is a self-supporting 
nothingness that must inhabit intentional stances (commitments) that it can never 
wholly identify with. But only through the lens of these stances can it attempt to 
understand what it is. 
 
[I]n what we shall call the world of the immediate, which delivers itself to our 
unreflective consciousness, we do not first appear to ourselves, to be thrown 
subsequently into enterprises. Our being is immediately “in situation”; that is, it 
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arises in enterprises and knows itself first in so far as it is reflected in those 
enterprises. We discover ourselves then in a world peopled with demands, in the 
heart of projects “in the course of realization”.63
 
Anxiety is the implicit recognition of this state of affairs. It is attuned to the blurry 
boundaries and ‘comet’s tails’64 that signify contingency amidst the fore-grounded 
urgency of our commitments. It is anxiety that enables the authentic fluidity of 
thought, action and responsibility that is the essence of the for-itself; anxiety that is 
alive to the paradoxical condition of a being which is ‘what it is not’ and ‘not what it 
is’. In anxiety we encounter our ontology as one that is disruptive and sometimes 
threatening. It tells us that wherever we are standing is not stable, and, as importantly, 
not as stable as we usually take it to be. This instability reveals itself in a number of 
ways: in feelings of uncanniness, in a sense of the ineffable, in ambiguity, and in 
various forms of alienation.65  
    Hauntings – usually non-slimy metaphysical monsters – perhaps provide the most 
direct parallel between existential anxiety and art-horror. In films like Poltergeist and 
The Others characters cling on to an inexplicable between-world inhabited by 
ambiguous forms. As with nausea, Sartre’s writing on anxiety is replete with this kind 
of imagery. Being-for-itself is ghostly. It ‘haunts’,66 or ‘possesses’, but never is, and 
this quality itself can only be grasped in glimpses, out of the corner of an anxious eye. 
Look at it head on and it slips away (Mathieu) or solidifies (the people in the café). In 
the section on being-for-others he says, in no uncertain terms, that, ‘to-be-in-the-
world is to haunt the world, not to be ensnared by it’.67  
    For Sartre anxiety is central to the for-itself’s authentic self-awareness – it is 
consciousness of itself as essentially ‘nihilating’.68 It encounters the world via 
multiple intentional stances including questions, feelings and expectations such that 
‘negation’ is woven into its fabric. Anguish is a recognition of ‘being both this past 
and this future and as not being them’.69 The choice of a (very distinctive kind of) 
affective state indicates on the one hand the difficulty of articulating this near-
paradoxical condition, and on the other the importance for Sartre that this is 
nevertheless a condition we are always aware of (because we are it). What we are, 
essentially, by virtue of being a nothingness and a locus of freedom, is fluid and 
unstable. Anxiety indicates constant flux – I am this, yet I am nothing; a ‘being which 
is its own Nothingness’.70 Sartre speaks of ‘an infinite number of realities … which in 
their inner structure are inhabited by negation’.71 These négatités are constant 
possibilities. We do not have to view them as threatening, but they disallow 
something we might prefer – stable meanings, greater predictability and control; 
shadows of the en-soi-pour-soi. 
   ‘I am no one’, says Regan MacNeil’s possessing demon in The Exorcist, and a 
similar neo-tragic (or at least pitiable) metaphor seems to inhere in certain vampire 
tales. Neither dead nor alive, explosively allergic to the contour defining sunlight, this 
reflection-less, liquid-feeding creature is in a sense powerful and independent, but 
also vulnerable and parasitic. Confined to the shadows, it has no soul, no substance, is 
unable to form proper bonds with others, and is defined overwhelmingly by its 
actions, which in the final count can amount to nothing beyond an endless cycle of 




IV: Monsters and authenticity 
   Existential protagonists like Roquentin usually end up striving to come to terms 
with their condition. In other words they look for ways to answer Nietzsche’s call to 
affirm ‘all that is questionable and terrible in existence’.72 Although forms of nausea 
and anxiety can never be absent from our condition, they can in a sense be accepted 
rather than denied via a metaphysical honesty and courage that preserves and 
stimulates a basic passion for life. Often this takes the form of an engaged and 
committed creativity applied to personal desires and values, but it can take more 
meditative forms as well. Considering the categorical gymnastics involved in this 
process, it is not surprising that when our existential hero approaches this state he can 
play the part of the monster. To the extent that our hero has managed to accommodate 
life’s oddness, he will appear odd, in particular to those unaware of the nature of the 
challenge faced. 
     A graphic representation of this dynamic is found in Kafka’s Metamorphosis. If 
Gregor’s transformation can be understood as a symbol of self-creation amidst the 
pressures of an alienating and ‘levelled’ social existence, then his grotesque and 
unfathomable appearance is an analogue of the fear and confusion of those around 
him. In his authentic shift he becomes unclassifiable and threatening, and hence 
horrifying.  
    However, it is revealing to consider how these immediate others – his family in 
particular – deal with this apparent threat. Whereas authentic characters like 
Roquentin and Conrad’s Marlow change to accommodate it, those surrounding 
Gregor attempt to assimilate him within their pre-existing schemas. At various points 
he is seen, for example, as unwell (chief clerk), as something to be cared for (sister), 
as aggressive (father), or as his past self (mother). Through this process life’s 
ambiguity as expressed by Gregor’s horrifying presence hardens into contempt as he 
is made the scapegoat for the family’s ills. Gregor becomes an ‘it’,73 just a cockroach. 
In bad faith the monster is defeated. 
    An implication of this is that authenticity involves allowing being to reveal itself in 
its uniqueness and peculiarity. Although the other, or existence, will always retain a 
degree of mystery, the individual is required to open up to it, or else remain in an 
alienated state of horror or denial. Horror or nausea like Roquentin’s as a response to 
the world and its inhabitants should be a temporary state; a stage or a reminder of the 
possibility, or the forgotten possibility, of authenticity.  
    In some of the best horror fictions we find a similar process. The employment of 
the usual means of overcoming threats (medicine, guns) fail, and a categorical shift is 
required for effective confrontation, a shift that can require a change in the 
protagonists as well. In The Exorcist, for example, only the religious categories of 
faith and sin, rather than science and medicine – Enlightenment thinking if you like – 
can make a dent on Regan’s condition. Religion aside, the implication is that there is a 
category mistake at the heart of our dealings with the world, and moreover one that is 
motivated by a desire to escape our ambiguous condition. The persistence of this 
world view causes a nausea that crystallizes and erupts in the form of Regan’s 
possession. The threat remains all the time we refuse to see existence for what it is. In 
Adrian Lyne’s Jacob’s Ladder, Jacob Singer is only released from his nightmare 
when he accepts death’s ultimate ‘claim’ on life. Buffy (the vampire slayer) is 
strengthened by her exposure to the monstrous and morally ambiguous qualities of 
herself and those close to her. In the Alien series Ripley develops characteristics of the 
monster: firstly its psychology, then its biology. In Alien Resurrection in particular the 
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‘intimate otherness of Ripley and the alien’ is expressed in Ripley’s clone’s 
ambivalent understanding of and response to her hybrid identity.74
    In these instances and others we find that an immense amount of effort, anguish, 
courage and time is needed to create this transformation. And even when it is 
achieved it is never stable; anxiety remains and (should the plot, especially its ending, 
allow for this) - as for Sartre’s gambler, Kierkegaard’s Abraham and Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra - there are constant challenges and temptations, and new reserves of these 
energies and virtues are periodically called upon.  
 
  
V: Explaining horror’s appeal 
   So far the aim of this article has been to establish that the presence of markedly art-
horrifying ideas, metaphors and imagery in the philosophy and literature of 
existentialism results from their shared preoccupation with the interstitial. From this 
point I would like to consider two hypotheses that can be derived from this shared 
concern. The first is that the ‘fascination’ element of monsters could in part be 
explicable by our concern for our own ambiguous ontology. The second, more 
contestable, suggestion is that part of art-horror’s appeal is that it allows for a partial 
expression and exploration of repressed, undeveloped or forgotten existential 
sensitivities. 
    The first argument runs as follows: although our ontology makes us anxious and 
nauseous it remains at the same time an issue of interest and curiosity for us. As such, 
clear expressions of ambiguousness and oddness will serve as a means for exercising 
these feelings, and of course this is precisely what is provided by horror stories and 
images. However, this raises the question: why horror in particular instead of science 
fiction and fantasy? One answer is just to reply that it has no privileged position over 
these other genres; they are appealing for the same reason. A stronger answer is to 
highlight the closer association between horror and existential sensitivity that exists 
precisely because of the presence of fear and disgust. In terms of our emotional 
engagement, horror is closer to the truth of our existence than are science fiction or 
fantasy. We often look for truth in art, even if it makes us uncomfortable. 
    This raises another question. If existential sensitivity is a reason for being drawn to 
horror, why not just read existential literature (or watch film noir)? Again, one answer 
is simply to acknowledge this and point out that the oddness of our ontology is one 
reason for liking horror, but not the only one. Many of us might appreciate horror all 
the more because of this connection, but we will also read Dostoyevsky, Sartre, 
Camus etc. There is a more interesting answer as well though, and this brings me to 
my second hypothesis.  
    I have already mentioned how fear and disgust are emotionally appropriate for an 
art form that in certain senses mirrors our ontology, and this point is aligned with 
Carroll’s solution to the paradox of horror. His ‘co-existential’ (as opposed to 
‘integrated’) theory is that we do not enjoy or seek out these negative feelings for 
their own sake, but rather tolerate them because of our fascination with the monsters 
themselves, and because of the intensity of the narratives their unknown and 
interstitial natures generate.75
    I am sympathetic to this view, but would also suggest (although Carroll would not 
agree) that there could also be some more ‘integrated’ existential-psychological 
benefits to experiencing art-horror.76 I want to propose that art-horror allows us to 
release and/or ‘exercise’ inchoate or latent existential feelings through their 
crystallization in the form of monsters. It has something in common with the dream 
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theory of Freud77 and the aesthetic theories of Burke,78 and it corresponds to a point 
mentioned briefly in the discussion of Metamorphosis in the previous section. 
    The crystallization process is epitomised by the tendency to turn anxiety into fear 
that has been discussed by, among others, Heidegger79 and Paul Tillich. Fear, for 
Tillich, ‘as opposed to anxiety …can be faced, analysed, attacked, endured’.80 
Exhausting and disturbing, the roots and implications of our existential nausea and 
anxiety not only motivate us to avoid these forms of attunement to the world, the 
nature of these roots and implications makes them in any case elusive and hard to 
grasp. And yet at the same time they are deep, serious (as opposed to lightweight or 
fun) and unavoidable.81  
    The result is a kind of build up of existential pressure that requires some form of 
expression, and my suggestion is that art-horror is especially well suited to this 
purpose. Freud’s theory of dreams is a useful analogy. For him events in dreams are 
partially disguised representations of discomforting ideas. Their ‘manifest’ meaning 
relates only obliquely to their ‘latent’ meaning in order to protect the dreamer, whilst 
at the same time allowing some release for their pent-up energy.82  
    This analogy implies that art-horror is an inauthentic substitute for a more 
transparent existential awareness; a process facilitating flight from the truth of our 
condition. Crucially though I do not want to claim that the channelling of existential 
strain into art-horror is simply the result of bad faith. This may well be one reason, but 
there are others. One concerns the initial discovery of our condition, an exploration 
that is perhaps initiated by a resonance between inchoate existential feelings and the 
weirdness of horror. The individual is searching for something, and the process 
involves not an escape, or even a respite from, inexorable existential tension, but 
rather its exploration via a medium in which the interstitial is vividly portrayed. The 
argument, which corresponds to a feature of Burke’s aesthetic theory,83 is this: the 
awareness of contingency, absurdity, freedom and death, develops in the individual as 
they become increasingly self-aware. Even for the seasoned and reflective adult these 
ideas and their ramifications are hard to acknowledge and express, but in the 
emerging individual (typically, a teenager) they are particularly inchoate. As the 
person continues to develop they can of course ignore these feelings (assuming forms 
of bad faith), or they can build towards moments of ‘awakening’ as Stephen Earnshaw 
aptly describes them.84  
    Another explanation for the substitutive role of art-horror is a form of non-
motivated forgetfulness to which people of more developed existential awareness are 
prone. The contingency of what exists and the nothingness of the self are ideas that 
are difficult to call to mind and attain heat for the individual, and thus they readily 
become buried under the clutter of the everyday. Not only do they deal in categorical 
ambiguity, but unlike the monsters of art-horror the human condition has no suitable 
analogue. A vampire or a zombie is, roughly speaking, a development and fusion of 
known types, but only for the self-conscious being does ‘existence precede essence’ 
with all that that entails. The upshot is that existential awareness is mostly latent, but 
as Burke says of these ‘finer feeling’, they need ‘exercise’ - to be ‘shaken and 
worked’ - to keep them from becoming ‘languid’.85  It is art-horror that offers, albeit 
often crudely, this exercise. It is then of course up to the individual as to whether the 
roots and implications of what is awakened are pursued and refined. 
    Carroll considers Burke’s theory and rejects it because it does not explain why 
‘horror would be sought out in particular’ rather than ‘any sort of object of terror’?86 I 
hope that the addition of latent existential emotions provides the missing link. The 
finer feelings that Burke is discussing here are aligned in particular with horror for all 
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the reasons previously discussed. The interstitial nature of human existence is 
mirrored far more precisely in the impure nature of horror monsters than it is in, say, 
fairground rides, traffic accidents or, for that matter, smelly bins.87 Of course, Burke’s 
exercise theory can contribute to an explanation of why we seek out these weird thrills 
as well, but here we need only combine it with my existential theory in order to 




    To conclude this article and summarize the arguments and evidence for these links 
between horror and existentialism I will highlight four points. 
    First, horror monsters are interstitial, a notion central to many of the defining 
concerns of existentialism. As with the ‘over-flowing’ objects of Roquentin’s 
nightmarish experience and the ghostly for-itself of Being and Nothingness, in many 
of its most horrific manifestations the horror monster is likewise present, in some 
ways familiar, but also profoundly uncanny and unknowable.  
    Second, the emotions comprising art-horror are fear (and anxiety) and disgust. 
Anxiety is fundamental to many existentialists, and forms of disgust (such as 
cynicism and contempt) are also commonly portrayed and explored. A further 
correspondence, mentioned but not developed in this article, is the presence in horrors 
of the radically other or unknown, and forms of religiousness or mysticism 
identifiable in the philosophy of Heidegger as well as some monotheistic religious 
existentialists.  
    Overall it can be concluded that the key affective state for both horror and 
existentialism is anxiety. It captures the sense of threat most obviously associated 
with fear; a situation’s inherent unfamiliarity (or uncanniness) that has been shown to 
be linked to disgust and nausea, and also a kind of curiosity or anticipation in the face 
of the unknown and unknowable. 
    The third point is that besides the recognition of the horror genre’s pronounced 
suitability for expressing existentialism’s preoccupation with the unstable and 
interstitial nature of existence, it can also be hypothesised that this connection can 
offer a solution to the paradox of horror. Embedded in a graphic narrative and with 
their very particular form of grotesque threat, horror monsters engage us emotionally, 
but in a way that serves as a symbol. Like Sartre’s slime, they represent the division 
between major ontological categories, and eventually the anxious nature of the for-
itself. Horror not only fascinates with its stories of interstitial life, it releases some 
pressure on, and allows us to exercise, our existentially intelligent emotionality.  
    Lastly the various responses to the human predicament explored by existentialists 
can also be identified in horror fictions. Of particular interest is the way that an on-
going requirement for the authentic individual to establish terms with, rather than 
defeat or deny, their condition is mirrored in the narratives of heroic and aware 
protagonists, particularly in some of the more sophisticated examples of horrors. 
Further research could usefully assess the possibility that horror plays a transitional 
role in the Western individual’s existential development, and in particular the 
movement towards disenchantment. Let us suppose that teenagers are typically yet to 
fully understand our disenchanted world. And let us suppose that supernatural horrors 
are like fairytales with an edge. And let us suppose further that that edge corresponds 
to a creeping awareness that life is not what we thought it was, and certainly not what 
we would like it to be. Still craving and enjoying the simplicity and supernatural 
promise of fairytales, your wised up teenager can have them only in exchange for 
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discomfort. In this way the emotions of art-horror correspond to a developing 
cynicism and scepticism about the world. The next step in existential awareness might 
then be surreal works like Nausea and Metamorphosis and the plays of Beckett; then 
the disillusioned but angry early works of Dostoyevsky, Camus and Bellow (and 
perhaps noir-ish films) where instead of literal nausea in the face of the world there is 
another variant of disgust – cynicism or nihilism. Beyond this I can imagine a 
predilection for less rebellious, more self-reflective works like Sartre’s Roads to 
Freedom trilogy, Heart of Darkness and Milan Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness 
of Being that signifies increasing authenticity.88 Such speculation suggests a potential 
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